UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI			
EASTERN DIVISION			
RAYMOND REDLICH and CHRISTOPHER OHNIMUS,			
Plaintiffs,	Case No. 4:19-cv-00019		
V.			
	COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND		
municipality and political	INJUNCTIVE RELIEF – CIVIL RIGHTS		
subdivision of the State of Missouri,	[42 U.S.C. § 1983]		
Defendant.			
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF			
"I was hungry, and you gave me something to eat; I was thirsty, and you gave me something to drink; I was a stranger, and you invited me in; naked, and you clothed me; I was sick, and you visited me; I was in prison, and you came to meTruly, I say to you, to the extent that you did it to one of these brothers of mine, even the least of them, you did it to me." – Gospel of Matthew 25:35-36, 40			
		Introduction	
		1. On October 31, 2018, a police officer employed by the City of St. Louis ("the	
City") gave the Plaintiffs, Raymond Redlich ("Redlich") and Christopher Ohnimus			
("Ohnimus") City Court Summonses because, in an effort to fulfill their religious			
obligation to provide food to the hungry, they were sharing bologna sandwiches with			
homeless persons on the streets of the City.			
2. Although the summonses did not specify what ordinance the Plaintiffs had			
allegedly violated, the police officer who issued the citations also provided the			
	RAYMOND REDLICH and CHRISTOPHER OHNIMUS,  Plaintiffs,  V.  CITY OF ST. LOUIS, a municipality and political subdivision of the State of Missouri,  Defendant.  COMPLAINT FOR DECLARAT  "I was hungry, and you gave me som me something to drink; I was a strang clothed me; I was sick, and you visited Truly, I say to you, to the extent that even the least of them, you did it to me Lintro  1. On October 31, 2018, a police of City") gave the Plaintiffs, Raymond Red ("Ohnimus") City Court Summonses be obligation to provide food to the hungry, homeless persons on the streets of the City.  2. Although the summonses did red.		

Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988; 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). 1 2This Court is empowered to grant the relief the Plaintiffs request pursuant to the federal Declaratory Judgment Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri is the 4 proper venue for this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events 5 6 giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims occurred in St. Louis City. 7 10. Venue is proper in the Eastern Division pursuant to Local Rule 3-2.07. **PARTIES** 8 9 11. Plaintiff Redlich is a citizen of the United States and a citizen of Missouri who lives and works in St. Louis City. 10 11 12. Plaintiff Ohnimus is a citizen of the United States and a citizen of Missouri who lives and works in St. Louis City. 12 13 13. Defendant City of St. Louis, is a municipality and political subdivision of the State of Missouri. 14 15 **FACTS** 14. Redlich is a Christian who believes it is his obligation as a follower of Jesus 16 Christ to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, and to provide love, compassion, 17 and company to the suffering. See, e.g., Gospel of Matthew 25:31-46. 18 19 15. In obedience to the demands of his faith and his conscience, Redlich has for years sought out neighbors in need of food, drink, companionship, and warmth so 20 that he could address their needs and so that, through the acts of providing food, 21 22drink, blankets, hats, gloves, companionship, and prayer, he might communicate to 23

the recipients that God loves and values them, regardless of their circumstances. 16. As a result of Redlich's ministry, he has developed friendships with many of those he has served, and his efforts have also occasionally resulted in the persons he has served coming to share Redlich's faith and choosing to become Christians. 17. Ohnimus himself has previously experienced hard times, and he has welcomed the food, drink, fellowship, and encouragement that Redlich and others freely provided. 18. The receipt of food, drink, fellowship, and encouragement from Redlich and others eventually led Ohnimus to begin serving others in the same way he had once been served. 19. Ohnimus also believes it is his religious obligation as a follower of Jesus Christ to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, and to provide love, compassion, 12 13 and company to the suffering. 14 20. Ohnimus uses the acts of providing food, drink, blankets, hats, gloves, 15 companionship, and prayer, to communicate to the recipients that God loves and 16 values them regardless of their circumstances. 21. On October 31, 2018, Redlich and Ohnimus were engaging in religious practice, communicating God's love to homeless persons by providing them with 18 19 water, bologna sandwiches, prayer and fellowship on the streets of the City. 20 22. Redlich and Ohnimus were sharing these bologna sandwiches just hours before thousands of other St. Louisans would celebrate Halloween by sharing food at parties and handing out goodies to trick-or-treaters.

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- 23. For some of the people with whom Redlich and Ohnimus interacted, the bologna sandwiches they received would be the only food they would get to eat that day.
- 24. Stephen Ogunjobi ("Ogunjobi"), an officer of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, observed Redlich and Ohnimus sharing food with homeless people, told them that what they were doing was unlawful, and issued each of them a City Court Summons to appear at a specific date and time "to answer a complaint information charging [them] with 'operating w/o permit'." A true and correct copy of the summons issued to Redlich is attached to this complaint as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1.
- 25. Each summons stated that failure to appear in court at the specified date and time might result in the issuance of a warrant for their arrest.
  - 26. Each summons was issued under the color of law.
- 27. Although the summonses did not specify any ordinance alleged to have been violated, Ogunjobi gave Redlich and Ohnimus a flyer entitled "Requirements for Operating a Temporary Food Establishment" and a two-page document entitled "Feeding the Homeless." True and correct copies of each of these documents are attached to this complaint as Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2 and 3.
- 28. The "Feeding the Homeless" document expressly states that "Food prepared in a private home may not be used or offered for human consumption to the public" and that anyone distributing food must obtain either a "temporary food service establishment" permit (which itself requires the applicant to have a separate "vendor's permit") or a "permanent food service establishment" permit (which

1 requires the applicant to have a business license and to submit to an inspection). 229. The document entitled "Requirements for Operating a Temporary Food Establishment" expressly states "Foods prepared in a home or other facility not under 3 inspection are prohibited," and it states that any person distributing food must have 4 present "three food-grade washtubs/containers and [a] 5-gallon or larger container of 5 potable water," a "waste receptacle," "a handwashing facility," and "hair coverings." 6 30. Upon information and belief, the documents the officer provided Redlich 7 and Ohnimus reflect the City's official position, limiting the circumstances under 8 9 which residents may lawfully share food with their neighbors on the streets of the 10 City. 11 31. Upon information and belief, the City bases its official position on the Temporary Food Service Ordinance. 12 13 32. Upon information and belief, the City's police officers have over the past few years given citations to a number of persons other than the Plaintiffs for the 14 15 alleged offense of unlawfully sharing food with homeless persons in a manner that 16 did not comply with the City's restrictions. 33. The Plaintiffs do not dispute the City's interpretation of the Temporary 17 Food Service Ordinance as requiring anyone who would share food with homeless 18 persons to obtain one or more permits and to comply with the same regulations the 19 20 City imposes on food service professionals. 21 34. The Plaintiffs do not allege that the Temporary Food Service Ordinance is 22 facially unconstitutional; they concede that it may constitutionally be applied against 23

individuals engaged in the commercial preparation and distribution of food to the 1  $^{2}$ public. 35. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend that as applied to them and to others 3 similarly situated the Temporary Food Service Ordinance unconstitutionally and 4 unlawfully restricts their free exercise of religion, their freedom of expression, their 5 freedom of association, their rights of conscience, and denies them equal protection of 6 7 the laws. 8 36. Redlich and Ohnimus share food with their neighbors on the street several 9 days out of each week, using their food-sharing efforts to share God's love with scores 10 of St. Louisans each week. 11 37. The foods that Redlich and Ohnimus share with the hungry on the streets of the City are frequently donated by local churches; they are sometimes, though not 12 13 always, prepared in facilities subject to inspection by the City. 14 38. In addition to the food, water, clothing, and blankets that Redlich and 15 Ohnimus provide, they also provide faith-related written material such as 16 information sheets, gospel tracts, and copies of sermons. 39. Redlich and Ohnimus believe that if they are not allowed to share food 17 with their neighbors, it will dramatically impact not only the performance of their 18 19 religious duty and the number of people willing to receive their message, but it will 20 also make their message of love and concern for those in need seem less sincere; they believe that blankets and water are not an adequate substitute for food when it comes 2122to demonstrating love and concern for the recipients' well-being.

1	40. The Plaintiffs do not have the resources to obtain the permits the City says	
2	are required to share food with the homeless, nor do they have the resources to obtain	
3	and carry with them the equipment the City requires of those operating a permitted	
4	Temporary Food Establishment.	
5	41. If the Plaintiffs were limited to sharing foods prepared in facilities subject	
6	to inspection by the City, their ability to share food with the needy would, at best, be	
7	severely limited and would, at worst, be eliminated altogether.	
8	42. Many of the people with whom the Plaintiffs share food have physical or	
9	psychological conditions that would prevent them from going to a permitted Food	
10	Service Establishment.	
11	43. Redlich and Ohnimus also believe that their faith requires them to seek	
12	out those in need and serve them where they are found, not to require the hungry	
13	to come to a centralized location before they can receive the food they need.	
14	CLAIMS FOR RELIEF	
15	COUNT I	
16	Free Exercise of Religion –	
17	First and Fourteenth Amendments	
18	44. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations made in each	
19	preceding paragraph as if each allegation was set forth herein.	
20	45. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to state	
21	and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the government	
22	to prohibit the free exercise of religion.	
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- 46. The City has acted under the color of law to interfere with the Plaintiffs' freedom to carry out an act required by their religious convictions, thus violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
- 47. Specifically, the City has interpreted and enforced the Temporary Food Service Ordinance in such a way that it would be unlawful for the Plaintiffs to fulfill their religious obligation to share food with hungry persons on the streets of St. Louis because the Plaintiffs cannot reasonably comply with the City's permitting and regulatory requirements.
- 48. Neither Redlich nor Ohnimus could afford to purchase food prepared at one of the City's "approved" facilities (which are primarily restaurants and grocery stores) in quantities sufficient to serve the number of neighbors who need their help.
- 49. The facts of this case show that the Plaintiffs face a real, concrete threat of arrest and prosecution if they continue to fulfill their religious obligation to share food with hungry persons on the streets of St. Louis.
- 50. The U.S. Supreme Court has previously held, in *Employment Division v*. *Smith*, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), that, so long as a law is religiously-neutral and generally applicable, the Free Exercise Clause does not require courts to apply heightened judicial scrutiny to that law even if it infringes upon a person's religious practice.
- 51. The Plaintiffs in this case expressly contend that *Employment Division* was incorrect on this point and that a proper understanding of the Free Exercise Clause requires courts to subject even a religiously-neutral, generally applicable law to the strict scrutiny insofar as that law's application makes it unlawful for a person

to engage in a practice required by their religion or requires a person to perform an act prohibited by their religion; the Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Court is bound to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in *Employment Division*, but they wish to preserve for review the question of whether *Employment Division* should be overturned.

- 52. But even if *Employment Division* was correctly decided, the majority opinion in that case suggests that a religiously-neutral, generally applicable law will be subject to strict scrutiny if it restricts a religious practice that is also linked with another constitutionally-protected freedom, such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of association. *See Employment Division*, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
- 53. Consequently, even if strict scrutiny might not be warranted by the mere fact that the City is applying the Temporary Food Service Ordinance in a way that burdens the Plaintiffs' religious duty to share food with the hungry, this Court should nonetheless apply strict scrutiny because (as described below) the restricted religious act is inextricably tied to the Plaintiffs' freedom of expression and freedom of association.
- 54. When courts apply strict scrutiny, the challenged law is presumed to be unconstitutional and the government can only justify the infringement of constitutional freedoms by showing that the law advances a compelling government interest and that the law is narrowly tailored so that it does not prohibit more constitutionally-protected liberty than is necessary to serve that compelling government interest.

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1 55. In this case, the City cannot show that the Temporary Food Service 2Ordinance is narrowly tailored; the City's application of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance to the Plaintiffs reveals that the ordinance prohibits far more 3 constitutionally-protected conduct than is necessary to serve any compelling 4 government interest. 5 6 56. Unless this Court declares that the Temporary Food Service Ordinance is 7 unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs and to persons similarly situated, the 8 Plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable harm due to the deprivation of their 9 freedom to fulfill their religious obligation to share food with the hungry persons they 10 encounter on the streets of St. Louis. 11 **COUNT II** Freedom of Expression— 12 13 First and Fourteenth Amendments 14 57. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations made in each 15 preceding paragraph as if each allegation was set forth herein. 16 58. Constitutional protection for the freedom of speech extends beyond the spoken or written word, reaching expressive conduct as well. 17 18 59. Many people in our society treat those living on the streets as nuisances to be ignored or avoided rather than as fellow human beings worthy of respect, time, 19 20 attention, and compassion. 21 60. In addition to being an act required by their faith, Redlich and Ohnimus 22believe that sharing food with those living on the streets sends a crucial message, 23

both to the recipient of the food and to the surrounding community, that the recipient 1 2is a loved and valued member of society; Redlich and Ohnimus use the sharing of food to build relationships with their neighbors living on the street and to communicate 3 their message about God's love and concern for even the dispossessed and "the least 4 of these." 5 61. The Temporary Food Service Ordinance restricts the Plaintiffs' freedom of 6 7 expression because preparing food for others and sharing it with them is a uniquely 8 powerful way to communicate love for and solidarity with the food's recipients-9 particularly when those recipients may feel unwanted by the community that 10 surrounds them. 11 62. In addition to the message the Plaintiffs convey through the act of sharing food with those in need, the Plaintiffs also distribute gospel tracts and written 12 13 sermons alongside the food they share, amplifying the expressive nature of the act. 14 63. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the act of publicly 15 sharing food with the homeless—particularly in conjunction with the distribution of 16 literature—is an expressive act within the protections of the First Amendment. See Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1242 17 (11th Cir. 2018). 18 19 64. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, "the significance of sharing meals with others dates back millennia," and the court specifically made reference to Jesus's 20 21 sharing of meals with tax collectors and sinners "to demonstrate that they were not outcasts in his eyes," as well as to the way that our Thanksgiving holiday centers 22 23

upon the idea that sharing food is way of expressing thanks for blessings. Id. at 1243. 1 265. This Court should subject the City's application of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance to strict scrutiny under the hybrid rights theory endorsed in 3 Employment Division, because the Plaintiffs' sharing of food is both an exercise of 4 religion and an expressive act. 5 6 66. However, if this Court declines to apply strict scrutiny, it must apply the 7 test set forth in U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to determine if the City's 8 application of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance improperly restricts the Plaintiffs' freedom of expression. 9 10 67. The O'Brien test requires the government to assert a substantial 11 government interest, but (upon information and belief) the City's interest in prohibiting residents from freely sharing food with the homeless is rooted in the City's 12 assumption that controlling where and under what circumstances people may 13 14 lawfully assist others in need will allow the City to steer homeless persons into parts 15 of town where their existence will be less noticeable; trying to make the homeless less noticeable is not even a legitimate governmental interest, much less a "substantial" 16 government interest. 17 68. Even if the City contends that its application of the Temporary Food 18 Service Ordinance is supported by an interest in safeguarding the health and safety 19 20 of homeless persons, the City would still fail the O'Brien test because it cannot 21 produce evidence that those living on the City's streets are better off going hungry 22rather than eating food freely shared with them by people who sincerely care about

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69. Because the City has no legitimate interest in trying to make the homeless less noticeable, and because denying homeless persons access to food prepared and freely offered by those who care about their health and comfort does not advance any interest the City might have in safeguarding the health and safety of homeless persons, the City cannot justify its application of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance against the Plaintiffs and others who wish to engage in the expressive act of sharing food with the homeless.

70. Unless this Court declares that the Temporary Food Service Ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs and to persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable harm due to the deprivation of their freedom to engage in the expressive act of sharing food with hungry persons they encounter on the streets of St. Louis.

## **COUNT III**

## Equal Protection of the Laws and Freedom of Association— First and Fourteenth Amendments

- 71. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations made in each preceding paragraph as if each allegation was set forth herein.
- 72. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;" in other words, the law should treat all similarly-situated persons alike.
  - 73. Where the government applies a law or policy in such a way that groups of

people are treated differently, courts must evaluate whether that differential 1 2treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause. 74. Courts apply strict scrutiny where the differential treatment under the law 3 is based on a suspect classification or affects a fundamental right. 4 75. The City's policy of applying the Temporary Food Service Ordinance to 5 prohibit the non-commercial sharing of food with homeless persons creates a 6 7 differential treatment that affects the Plaintiffs' freedom of associationfundamental right protected under the First Amendment and applied to state and 8 9 local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 76. It is extraordinarily common for people to share with each other food 11 prepared in homes or other locations that have not been given City permits or inspections; residents acting without a City permit might bring home-prepared food 12 to each others' houses, to picnics in a park, to backyard barbeques, to celebrations at 13 14 a school, to meetings at an office, to potluck dinners at a church, or to tailgate parties 15 outside of sporting events. 77. The City has not contended that sharing home-prepared food in any of 16 these contexts might run afoul of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance. 17 18 78. Instead, the City has focused on applying the Temporary Food Service Ordinance in such a way that it is unlawful for residents freely to share food with 19 20 homeless persons—thus penalizing those residents on the basis of those with whom they choose to associate. 212279. Had the Plaintiffs chosen to share food in a neighbor's home or backyard, 23

at a school, church, or office, or outside of a sporting event, the City would not have 1 2interfered. It is only because the Plaintiffs chose to share food with hungry neighbors who are living on the streets that the City issued them summonses and ordered them 3 to show up in court or to face arrest.<sup>1</sup> 4 5 80. Because the City's application of the Temporary Food Service Ordinance 6 applies the law differently based on the persons with whom the Plaintiffs have chosen 7 to associate, this Court must apply strict scrutiny when evaluating the Plaintiffs' 8 Equal Protection claim. 9 81. The City's selective application of the law against those sharing food with the homeless cannot survive strict scrutiny because the policy does not advance any 10 11 compelling government interest and the policy is not narrowly tailored because it prohibits far more constitutionally-protected liberty than is necessary to serve any 12 13 compelling interest the City might invoke. 14 82. In the alternative, the City's application of the Temporary Food Service 15 Ordinance also violates the Equal Protection Clause because it denies one group of residents—homeless persons—the freedom to make choices that all other persons 16 17 enjoy when it comes to accepting food freely offered by others. 18 83. Residents freely offered home-prepared food while associating with people in any of the contexts noted in Paragraph 79 would be free to decide for themselves 19 20 whether to accept and eat the food; the City's policy treats homeless people like 21

<sup>1</sup> It was only after the Plaintiffs had both arrived at the City Court and waited nearly an hour for their citations to be addressed that the City Attorney told them that he would not pursue the case against them.

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second-class citizens by denying them the freedom to make that choice. 84. The City cannot show any evidence that denying homeless people the freedom to choose whether they will accept and eat food freely offered to them on the streets advances any legitimate governmental interest. 85. Unless this Court declares that the Temporary Food Service Ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs and to persons similarly situated, the Plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable harm due to the deprivation of the equal protection of the laws which has resulted because of their association with the hungry persons they encounter on the streets of St. Louis. **COUNT IV** 10 Rights of Conscience— Missouri Constitution Article I, Section 5 12 13 86. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations made in each preceding paragraph as if each allegation was set forth herein. 87. Sharing food with those in need is not just an exercise of religion, it is an 16 act that Redlich and Ohnimus feel compelled to perform as a matter of conscience. 88. The Missouri Constitution recognizes protections for citizens' "rights of conscience" that go above and beyond the protections the First Amendment 18 19 acknowledges for the "free exercise of religion," stating "[t]hat all men and women 20 have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; [and] that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience" other than to prevent "practices inconsistent

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1	with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others." Compar
2	U.S. Const. Amendment I with Mo. Const. Art. I, § 5.
3	89. The Plaintiffs contend that even if the First and Fourteenth Amendment
4	do not require courts to apply strict scrutiny to the City's application of the
5	Temporary Food Service Ordinance, the City's application of this ordinance agains
6	the Plaintiffs has nonetheless improperly interfered with their rights of conscience.
7	90. Because the City cannot show that freely sharing food with homeles
8	persons is "inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the
9	rights of others," Article I, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits the City from
0 0	interfering with that act.
1	91. Unless this Court declares that the Temporary Food Service Ordinance i
12	unconstitutional as applied to the Plaintiffs and to persons similarly situated, the
13	Plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable harm due to the City's unjustified
4	interference with their rights of conscience, which compel the Plaintiffs to share food
15	with the hungry persons they encounter on the streets of St. Louis.
16	COUNT V
17	Missouri Religious Freedom Restoration Act—
18	Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302
19	92. The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations made in each
20	preceding paragraph as if each allegation was set forth herein.
21	93. In 2003 the Missouri General Assembly passed the Missouri Religiou
22	Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits any government authority from
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Plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable harm due to the deprivation of their freedom to exercise their religion by sharing food with the hungry persons they encounter on the streets of St. Louis. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court: A. Issue a declaration that St. Louis City Code § 11.42.230, Chapter 9, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as applied to the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; B. Issue a declaration that St. Louis City Code § 11.42.230, Chapter 9, violates Article I, Section 5 of the Missouri Constitution as applied to the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; C. Issue a declaration that St. Louis City Code § 11.42.230, Chapter 9, violates Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302 as applied to the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; D. Issue an injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing St. Louis City Code § 11.42.230, Chapter 9, against the Plaintiffs and others similarly situated; E. Award Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs; and F. Provide all further legal and equitable relief that the Court may deem just and proper.

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1	Dated this 8th day of January, 2019.	Respectfully submitted,
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3		Davil Roll
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